The Interplay Between Lesser-Included Offenses and Double Jeopardy: The Case of R.E.F. v. State of Alabama

In a case that provides important clarification about double jeopardy when certain charges were reduced to their lesser-included offenses, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals recently presided over the appeal of R.E.F. v. State of Alabama. Arising from the heart of Houston County, the Court’s analysis defines the standards for convicting a defendant for multiple offenses arising from the same incident, while simultaneously reaffirming important principles of sentencing and lesser-included offenses in Alabama.

R.E.F. was indicted by a grand jury in September of 2018 for four sexual offense charges: one count of first-degree rape, one count of first-degree sodomy, and two counts of first-degree sexual abuse. The charges stemmed from the defendant’s relationship with E.E., his wife’s niece. The defendant and his wife became E.E.’s legal guardian when she was three years old, after which the sexual abuse began. Following his indictment, the defendant moved for a judgement of acquittal. Instead, a jury convicted R.E.F. of four counts of first-degree sexual abuse. In Alabama, first-degree sexual abuse is recognized as a lesser-included charge of both rape and sodomy, allowing the court to reduce the defendant’s charges of rape and sodomy to additional counts of sexual abuse. R.E.F. was subsequently sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment for each conviction. The court split the defendant’s sentence, ordering two years’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised probation. His sentences were to run concurrently.

On appeal, R.E.F. questioned whether his four convictions for first-degree sexual abuse violated double jeopardy principles, as the convictions arose from a single incident. His charges arose from §13A-6-66 of the Alabama Code, which provides a broad definition of first-degree sexual abuse. Under this section, first-degree sexual abuse requires sexual contact with a victim, either by forcible compulsion or with lack of consent due to incapacitation. The breadth of these elements allows first-degree sexual abuse to serve as a lesser-included charge to other sexual offenses, drawing R.E.F.’s rape and sodomy charges within the bounds of the statute.

The implications of this statute were further explored by the Court in the recent case of Wolfe v. State. Wolfe, similarly, was charged with multiple counts of rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse. Unlike R.E.F., Wolfe’s crimes spanned several separate instances, but the Court, when reviewing his convictions, considered whether the charges reflected the specific acts Wolfe had committed. Wolfe was charged with four counts of sodomoy, but the Court found that only two specific instances of sodomy were reflected by the evidence. Accordingly, the Court reversed the additional sodomy charges. While the Court has the authority to convict a defendant for multiple charges arising from the same incident, each charge must reflect a particular act of the defendant.

Reviewing this question, the Court cited two primary cases, Hendrix v. State and Terrell v. State. In both cases, which serve as longstanding precedent in Alabama, the Court held that when there is evidence of separate acts constituting separate offenses, multiple convictions and sentences are permissible, even when the separate offenses arise from the same incident. Further, the Court acknowledged the express recognition of first-degree sexual abuse as a lesser-included offense of both rape and sodomy, which applied to R.E.F. for his rape and sodomy charges. Applying these principles to R.E.F., the Court found that the charges for rape and sodomy arose from separate, distinct acts during the sexual abuse. When charges arise from separate offenses, the charges do not violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals rejected R.E.F.’s double jeopardy argument.

Although R.E.F.’s double jeopardy claim failed, he had an additional path to relief through the Split-Sentence Act, found in §15-18-8 of the Alabama Code. Neither side raised the argument, but on review, the Court noted that R.E.F.’s sentence exceeded the statutory maximum provided by §15-8-18(b). Under the statue, the maximum probationary term for each conviction is no more than three years. Accordingly, the case was remanded, with instructions to resentence R.E.F. with terms that comply with statutory requirements.

The case of R.E.F. v. State of Alabama provides important insight into the interplay between the various facets of criminal law. Double jeopardy, despite its colloquial understanding, does not limit the Court’s ability to convict a defendant for multiple charges arising from the same incident, but rather requires the Court to identify separate acts in support of each conviction. This same principle applies to lesser-included charges—although the defendant was charged with four counts of sexual abuse, each charge could be traced back to distinct, separate actions, even when his rape and sodomy charges were reduced. These principles, working in tandem, limited R.E.F.’s relief, but despite the validity of his convictions, the Court maintains a duty to uphold procedural requirements, ultimately reducing R.E.F.’s sentence.