When Can A Police Officer Use Deadly Force?

On Thanksgiving night in 2018, tragedy struck the Galleria Mall in Birmingham, Alabama. David Alexander, a police officer with the City of Hoover, was on foot patrol with his partner when chaos erupted. In a scene all too common in America, gunshots rang out in the crowded shopping center. Within seconds, Officer Alexander saw 21-year-old “E.J.” Fitzgerald Bradford Jr. approaching the area of the shooting with a handgun visibly at his side. Believing Bradford posed an immediate threat and without issuing a warning, Officer Alexander opened fire. Bradford was shot and killed, just ten feet from the two individuals who had been wounded.

In the aftermath, it was revealed that Bradford was a lawful gun owner with a valid permit. According to reports, he had moved toward the violence to intervene and stop the shooter. Instead of fleeing, Bradford made the courageous decision to act. Tragically, it cost him his life. The Killing Fitzgerald Bradford Jr. sent shockwaves through Birmingham and beyond. Bradford’s mother, April Pipkins, filed a lawsuit against Officer Alexander, the City of Hoover, and the entities that owned and operated the mall. Her suit alleged civil rights violations and wrongful death, seeking justice for her son and accountability for those responsible. The death of Bradford Jr. would go on to spark not only public outrage, but a significant legal battle over how claims of police misconduct are evaluated.

April Pipkins specifically asserted “Fourth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and negligence and wantonness claims under Alabama law for her son's death.” Pipkins v. City of Hoover, Alabama, 134 F.4th 1163, 1169 (11th Cir. 2025). In response to these claims, the Northern District of Alabama dismissed her case, stating that “Officer Alexander's use of deadly force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that, under the circumstances, providing a verbal warning was not feasible.” Id. On April 17, 2025, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding: “Given the circumstances, however, Officer Alexander acted reasonably and did not violate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1178.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their person, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has established that “apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). However, the use of deadly force does not violate the Fourth Amendment if, under the totality of the circumstances, it is justified. Id. Generally, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an officer may use deadly force if three elements are met: “(1) [The officer] has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, (2)[the officer] reasonably believes that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent escape, and (3)[the officer] has given some warning about the possible use of deadly force, if feasible.” Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1218–19 (11th Cir. 2016). In this case, Pipkins argued that the officer “(1) he lacked probable cause to believe that Mr. Bradford presented a serious or deadly threat, and (2) there is a genuine dispute… as to whether a verbal warning was feasible.” Pipkins, 134 F.4th 1163, 1169.

When evaluating whether the first element for the use of deadly force is met, specifically, whether the officer had probable cause to believe the suspect presented a deadly threat, the court assesses the situation from the perspective “of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 775 (2014). This means that if it was reasonable for the officer at the scene to use deadly force, then such force may be justified. Pipkins, 134 F.4th 1163, 1171. In Pipkins, the court held that “under the circumstances and given the short amount of time available to him, Officer Alexander reasonably perceived Mr. Bradford to be the shooter.” Id. It was reasonable to view an “armed man in an enclosed crowded space, where gunshots had just been fired, moving toward two men, one of whom appeared injured… [Therefore, there was] probable cause to believe that Mr. Bradford was the shooter and a serious threat.” Id. Accordingly, the first element for the use of deadly force was satisfied in this case.

When evaluating whether the third element for the use of deadly force is met—specifically, whether it was feasible for the officer to warn the suspect—the court assesses the situation from the perspective “of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Plumhoff, 572 U.S. 765, 775. Courts within the Eleventh Circuit “have declined to fashion an inflexible rule that… an officer must always warn his suspect before firing; particularly where such a warning might easily have cost the officer his life.” Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 854 (11th Cir. 2010). If “a warning was not feasible under the circumstances… [it is] not constitutionally required.” Pipkins, 134 F.4th 1163, 1172. The feasibility of a warning is generally determined by two variables. See id. “[First] the proximity of the danger to the officer or others and [Second] the time available to the officer.” Id. In this case, both factors weighed in favor of a warning not being feasible at the time of the shooting. Id. As the court noted, “Mr. Bradford was just ten feet away from the two men near the railing and was running in their direction with a gun ahead of Officer Alexander and his partner. Second, Officer Alexander had very little time to react; only five seconds elapsed from the sound of the first two gunshots to his use of deadly force.” Id. Accordingly, the court held, “Officer Alexander did not have to issue a warning to Mr. Bradford[.]… the lack of a warning did not make the use of deadly force excessive.” Id.

As both elements argued by Pipkins were met, the court concluded that the use of deadly force was justified and affirmed the dismissal of her claims. Id. The court reached the correct decision in this case, even though the outcome was undeniably tragic. Under the circumstances, the court rightly recognized that the officers could have reasonably believed Mr. Bradford was the shooter. The court also correctly determined that, had Bradford been the shooter, the officers would not have had time to issue a warning without a high probability of being shot themselves. Importantly, the court did not gloss over these issues. Instead, it maintained the high standard required for the use of deadly force and conducted a careful, fact-specific analysis.

Officer Alexander was not given a free pass for killing an innocent man. Rather, he was held to the constitutional standard that governs the use of deadly force, and in this case, he met that standard by acting reasonably in a rapidly evolving and dangerous situation. The Eleventh Circuit should be commended for upholding this standard and reinforcing that public officers must be held to the high bar the Constitution demands. While many are understandably upset that no one was held accountable for the tragic death of Mr. Bradford, the court made the correct decision based on the facts presented. Had the facts been different, the outcome likely would have been as well. But in this case, the court rightly found that the use of deadly force was justified due to the split-second nature of the decision the officer was forced to make.

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